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RE-VISITING JUNE 12 1993 NIGERIAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION RESULTS

By: Mobolaji E. Aluko, PhD , Burtonsville, MD, USA

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This article was originally published in October 1994

Introduction
Periodically, one sits down to reflect on why many individuals (including this writer) are so fixated on June 12, 1993, and why we consider that date so important in the annals of Nigeria's history. Are we just closet partisan ethnicists, or political demagogues, masquerading as Nigerian democrats?

Below, you will find an attempt to provide some answers based solely on the known numerical figures of the June 12, 1993 presidential elections. The claim is that the incontrovertibility of the results, the size of the national mandate and the ethnic compromises which led to it clearly reveal why the annulment of the elections has so far traumatized a country whose dream for the beginnings of a national consensus suddenly became a nightmare.

The Facts about June 12
The rigor of the election process leading up to the election day itself (the so-called Option A4 implemented by Babangida) is well known. As far as the election itself is concerned, first, all the vote counting had been completed and collated, on a ward-by-ward, local government-by-government and State-by-state basis, and known at these levels; the vote count was never suspended; the release was.

Secondly, the results had been published but never officially released in entirety by the National Electoral Commission (Nwosu as Chairman), a technicality that has been harped on by the governments succeeding Babangida's - of Sonekan, and currently of Abacha.

Thirdly, the two official allegations made by Babangida were that there was vote-buying before the elections (in fact there was a last-minute legal challenge requesting a postponement of the elections by the Association for a Better Nigeria (ABN), led by Arthur Nzeribe, which was thrown out by the Courts) and that the apparent winner Abiola (over challenger Tofa) had a conflict of interest since the Federal Government owes him substantial amounts of money from previous business dealings.

The detailed figures are presented in Table 1, and further analyses are presented in Tables 2,3 and 4.

Table 1
The Annulled June 12, 1993 Nigerian Presidential Elections:
Unofficial Results

			Votes Cast			% of Total
State	State Rank by 1991 census	Rank by total votes	Abiola	Tofa	Total	Abiola	Tofa	Region
Lagos	1	2	883,965	149,432	1,033,397	85.54	14.46	SW
Kano	2	22	169,519	154,809	324,328	52.27	47.73	NC
Sokoto	3	12	97,726	372,250	469,976	20.79	79.21	NW
Bauchi	4	4	339,339	524,876	864,175	39.27	60.73	NE
Rivers	5	3	370,678	640,973	1,011,651	36.64	63.46	MN
Kaduna	6	5	389,713	356,880	746,593	52.20	47.80	NC
Ondo	7	1	883.024	162,994	1.046,018	84.42	15.58	SW
Katsina	8	13	171,162	271,077	442,239	38.70	61.30	NC
Oyo	9	7	536.014	105,785	641,799	83.52	16.48	SW
Plateau	10	6	417,565	259,394	676,959	61.68	38.32	MB
Enugu	11	8	263,101	254,050	517,151	50.88	49.12	EA
Jigawa	12	27	138,557	89,636	228,193	60.72	39.28	NC
Benue	13	15	246,830	166,302	433,132	56.99	43.01	MB
Anambra	14	18	212,024	155,029	367,053	57.76	42.24	EA
Borno	15	25	153,490	128,684	282,174	54.40	45.60	NE
Delta	16	11	327,277	146,001	473,278	69.15	30.85	MN
Imo	17	20	159,350	195,836	355,186	44.86	55.14	EA
Niger	18	19	136,350	221,437	357,787	38.11	61.89	NW
Akwa Ibom	19	16	214,782	159,342	374,124	57.41	42.59	MN
Ogun	20	14	365,266	72,068	437,334	83.52	15.48	SW
Abia	21	26	105,273	151,227	256,500	41.08	58.96	EA
Osun	22	10	425,725	59,246	484,971	87.78	12.22	SW
Edo	23	23	205,407	103,572	308,979	66.48	33.52	MN
Adamawa	24	24	140,875	167,239	308,114	45.72	54.28	NE
Kogi	25	9	222,700	265,732	488,432	45.59	54.41	MC
Kebbi	26	28	70,219	144,808	215,027	32.66	67.34	NW
Cross River	27	21	189,303	153,452	342,755	55.23	44.77	MN
Kwara	28	17	288,270	80,219	368,489	78.23	21.77	MC
Taraba	29	30	101,887	64,001	165,888	61.42	38.58	MB
Yobe	30	29	111887	64,061	175,948	63.59	36.41	NE
FCT	31	31	19,968	18,313	38,281	52.16	47.84	MC
Total			8,357,246	5,878,685	14,235,931	58.71	41.29

Note the regions:
South-West (SW): Lagos, Ondo, Oyo, Ogun, Oshun {Abiola wins all 5 states}
East (EA): Enugu, Anambra, Imo, Abia {Abiola wins the first 2 states}
North-West (NW): Sokoto, Niger, Kebbi {Tofa wins all 3 states}
North-East (NE): Adamawa, Borno, Bauchi, Yobe {Abiola wins first 2 states}
North-Central(NC): Kano, Kaduna, Jigawa, Katsina {Abiola wins first 3 states}
Middle-Belt (MB): Plateau, Benue, Taraba {Abiola wins all 3 states}
Minority (MN): Delta, Akwa-Ibom, Edo, Cross-River, Rivers {Abiola wins first 4 states}
Mid-Central (MC): Kwara, Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Kogi {Abiola wins first 2 states}

The "traditional" Northern Region comprised the NW, NE, NC, MB and MC regions, the Western Region was the SW region, the Eastern Region comprised EA region, Akwa-Ibom, Cross-Rivers and Rivers States, and the Mid-West Region comprised Edo and Delta states.

Table 2:
State Analysis of 1993 Presidential Elections

State	State Rank by 1991 census	Rank by total votes	1991 Census Count	Census Votes Cast	Total Participation Index	Election Partic Ranking	Election Winner	Win Ratio
Lagos	1	2	5.685,781	1,033,397	40.21	13	Abiola	5.92
Kano	2	22	5,362,040	324,328	12.74	31	Abiola	1.10
Sokoto	3	12	4,392,391	469,976	23.67	27	Tofa	3.81
Bauchi	4	4	4,294,413	864,175	44.52	7	Tofa	1.55
Rivers	5	3	3,983,857	1,011,651	56.18	2	Tofa	1.73
Kaduna	6	5	3,969,252	746,593	41.62	8	Abiola	1.09
Ondo	7	1	3,884,485	1.046,018	59.58	1	Abiola	1.09
Katsina	8	13	3,878,344	442,239	25.23	23	Tofa	1.58
Oyo	9	7	3,488,789	641,799	40.70	11	Abiola	5.07
Plateau	10	6	3,283,784	676,959	45.61	6	Abiola	1.61
Enugu	11	8	3,161,295	517,151	36.19	14	Abiola	1.04
Jigawa	12	27	2,829,929	228,193	17.84	30	Abiola	1.55
Benue	13	15	2,780,398	433,132	34.47	16	Abiola	1.33
Anambra	14	18	2,767,903	367,053	29.34	21	Abiola	1.37
Borno	15	25	2,596,589	282,174	24.04	26	Abiola	1.92
Delta	16	11	2,570,181	473,278	40.74	10	Abiola	2.24
Imo	17	20	2,485,499	355,186	31.62	20	Tofa	1.23
Niger	18	19	2,482,367	357,787	31.89	18	Tofa	1.62
Akwa Ibom	19	16	2,359,736	374,124	35.08	15	Abiola	1.35
Ogun	20	14	2,338,570	437,334	41.38	9	Abiola	5.07
Abia	21	26	2,297,978	256,500	24.70	25	Tofa	1.44
Osun	22	10	2,203,016	484,971	48.71	5	Abiola	7.18
Edo	23	23	2,159,848	308,979	31.65	19	Abiola	1.98
Adamawa	24	24	2,124,049	308,114	32.09	17	Tofa	1.19
Kogi	25	9	2,099,046	488,432	51.48	4	Tofa	1.19
Kebbi	26	28	2,062,226	215,027	23.07	28	Tofa	2.06
Cross River	27	21	1,865,604	342,755	40.65	12	Abiola	1.23
Kwara	28	17	1,566,469	368,489	52.05	3	Abiola	3.59
Taraba	29	30	1,480,590	165,888	24.79	24	Abiola	1.59
Yobe	30	29	1,411,481	175,948	27.58	22	Abiola	1.75
FCT	31	31	378,671	38,281	22.37	29	Abiola	1.09
Total			88,515,581	14,235,931	35.58		Abiola	1.42

Notes on Table 2:
Election Participation Index = 100 * Numerator / Denominator

Numerator: Total number of votes cast in State (or region)
Denominator:1991 State (or Regional) Census multiplied by (40/88.5)

The Denominator is an estimate of the voting population (could be replaced by actual voter registration); 40 million is the voting population, 88.5 million is the total Nigerian population. The denominator presumes that the voter population is distributed uniformly throughout the country.

Note that an index close to 100 would indicate almost 100% voting. An index of over 100 could indicate some election fraud, unless there is significant on-sight registration.

Election Participation Ranking:
Ranking
1-10: Ondo*, Rivers, Kwara*, Kogi, Osun*, Plateau*, Bauchi, Kaduna*, Ogun*, Delta* {*Abiola wins 7, Tofa wins 3}

11-20: Oyo*, Cross-River*, Lagos*, Enugu*, Akwa-Ibom*, Benue*, Adamawa, Niger, Edo*, Imo {*Abiola wins 7, Tofa wins 3}

21-31: Anambra*, Yobe*, Katsina, Taraba*, Abia, Borno*, Sokoto, Kebbi, FCT*, Jigawa*, Kano* {*Abiola wins 7, Tofa wins 4}

Win ratio = Votes for winner / votes for opponent

Regional Analysis of Results
The above are the raw data. If you accept them, then the discussion can proceed. From these data we can get some information through interpretive analysis. Again, you may disagree with the conclusions, but you have the privilege of working with the same data and coming up with your own conclusions.

The analysis below is based on the following assumptions:

1. the 1991 census data is correct. (latest indications are that they are now being belatedly questioned at the National Constitutional Conference going on in Abuja.)

2. the 1993 Presidential results quoted above are correct;

3. the regional division of the states provided above is acceptable.

Table 3
Regional Analysis of 1993 Presidential Election Results

		Rankings		Votes Cast			% of
Region	Rank by 1991 census	Total	Votes & participation	Abiola	Tofa	Total	Abiola	Tofa
South West (SW)	1	1	2	3,093,994	549,525	3,643,519	84.92	15.08
East (EA)	4	5	6	739,748	756,142	1,495,890	49.45	50.55
North West (NW)	6	7	7	304,295	738,495	1,042,790	29.18	70.82
North East (NE)	5	4	5	745,591	884,820	1,630,411	45.73	54.27
North Central (NC)	2	3	8	868,951	872,402	1,741,353	49.90	50.10
Middle Belt (MB)	7	6	4	766,282	509,697	1,275,979	60.05	39.95
Minority (MN	3	2	3	1,307,447	1,203,340	2,510,787	52.07	47.93
Mid Central (MC	8	8	1	530,938	364,264	895,202	59.31	40.69
Total				8,357,246	5,878,685	14,253,931	58.71	41.29

Table 4:
Comparative Regional Analysis of Census/Results

					Rankings
Region	1991 Census Count	Census Votes Cast	Total Participation Index	Rank by 1991 census	Total	Votes & participation	Winner	Win Ratio
South West (SW)	17,600,641	3,643,519	45.80	1	1	2	Abiola	5.63
East (EA)	10,712,675	1,495,890	30.89	4	5	6	Tofa	1.02
North West (NW)	8,936,984	1,042,790	25.82	6	7	7	Tofa	2.43
North East (NE)	10,426,532	1,630,411	34.60	5	4	5	Tofa	1.19
North Central (NC)	16,309,565	1,741,353	23.62	2	3	8	Tofa	1.00
Middle Belt (MB)	7,544,772	1,275,979	37.42	7	6	4	Abiola	1.50
Minority (MN	12,939,226	2,510,787	42.93	3	2	3	Abiola	1.09
Mid Central (MC	4,044,186	895,202	48.97	8	8	1	Abiola	1.46
Total	88,514,581	14,253,931	35.38				Abiola	1.42

What the Regional Analysis Means - an Objective (?) View
Election results are often subjected to regional analyses because their outcomes affect the electorate most where they reside (city, state), and where they are most likely to travel (region). However, due to the peculiar ethno-geography and history of Nigeria, there is a keen identification between ethnic groups and regions: for example, the Yoruba live mostly in the South-West, the Hausa-Fulani mostly in the Northern regions, and the Igbo in the East.

Conseqently, ethnic qualifications of electoral trends, even when resisted (as this writer is attempting to), cannot be escaped. It is with the above riders that the following statements are made.

1. Total votes cast of 14.2 million is 35.6% of the voter population of 40 million (out of a total population of 88.5 milion). For a nation that is about 50% illiterate, that is a high percentage, and any mandate should be regarded as a national one.

2. If you compare the Rank by 1991 Census and the Election Participation Indices/Total Votes Rankings, there were some regions which appeared to be extremely keen on voting (Mid-Central, Middle Belt), others voted somewhat in proportion to their population (Southwest, Northeast, Minority), while some appeared relatively disinterested in voting (East, Northwest, particularly North Central.) Of course, this may have been a result of last minute confusion about whether the election was on or off.

3. The Southwest voted in favor of Abiola 6:1 relative to Tofa, the Northwest voted in favor of Tofa 2.5:1 relative to Abiola, the Middle-Belt and Mid-Central voted 1.5:1 in favor of Abiola, but everywhere else it was a toss-up, with Abiola having an edge in the Minority region, and Tofa having an edge in the East, Northeast and NorthCentral regions.

4. It is also interesting to note that Abiola won 5:1 in his home state (Ogun), and also edged Tofa in the latter's home state (Kano); furthermore, Kano State registered the lowest Election Participation Ranking as shown in Table 2. Note that Abiola won with the highest Win Ratio in Osun State (7.18), while Tofa won with his highest ratio in Sokoto State (3.81).

Taking the above together, Tofa seems to have won in regions where there was in general voter apathy, while Abiola won in regions where people were most keen on voting. Even on a state-by-state basis, this conclusion is justified.

The regional analysis also seems to debunk three myths:

1. The first myth is that Abiola could have won without including the SouthWest votes, a claim often made by his supporters to enhance their claim of Abiola's national appeal away from his home-base. Now, if we take the Southwest votes away from Abiola alone, Tofa wins:

   Abiola: 5,263,252 Tofa: 5,878,685

   If we take the Southwest votes away from both of them, Tofa still wins marginally:

   Abiola: 5,263,252 Tofa: 5,329,160

   Therefore, Abiola was actually very much helped by the Southwest votes. However, the analysis above shows that it was a keen contest with Abiola holding his own away from his home base, and subject to a loss if he had not. Any allegation of vote buying is difficult to justify from these numbers, particularly when we also look at the "reasonableness" of the Election Participation Indices of Tables 2 and 4.

2. In defence against accusations about lack of sustained post-annulment protests in the East, there have always been claims by some that the East voted "massively" for Abiola (Myth # 2), and hence had done all they could for the struggle for democracy. If that is the case, then there was also "massive" voting for Tofa, so much so that he won in the East Region.

   Abiola: 739,748 Tofa: 756,142

   Even if we include Cross River, Akwa-Ibom and Rivers States in the "East" (they are currently included in the Minority Region), then Tofa still wins the East:

   Abiola: 1,516,511 Tofa: 1,709,909

   with the Rivers State (out of these three non-Igbo Eastern states) contributing largely to maintaining the scale in favor of Tofa by voting for him 1.5:1 over Abiola.

   What the close vote for Abiola in the Igbo East shows is not "massive" voting, but rather a "magnaminous" heart of the Igbo in these elections, bearing in mind the following facts:

   1. Dr. Sylvester Ugo, vice-presidential candidate of Tofa, is Igbo and the former Central Bank Governor of Biafra. If Abiola's ticket prevailed, it would mean a rare period in which an Igbo would not be No. 1 or 2 in Federal government (notice Azikiwe, Ironsi, Ukiwe (albeit briefly), Ekwueme)

   2. there is still residual visceral resentment against Yorubas and Awolowo over the Biafran episode (Abiola is Yoruba).

3. The regional analysis also gives an insight into the pattern of protests following the annulment. Since the Southwest voted 6:1 for Abiola, it was most indignant about the annulment, and showed it, sometimes violently. Also, Edo State and Delta State both voted more than 2:1 for Abiola, hence a similar indignation. The disenchantment of Kwara State, which voted for Abiola 3.5:1 appears to have been embodied in the indignation of their former Governor, Chief C.O. Adebayo, who is one of the earliest and longest-held detainees.

   Elsewhere, where Tofa either won, or votes were evenly split, the human tendency to be a sore loser, or for each person to dissuade his neighbor from any violent tendency was bound to make the reaction much more muted than in the Southwest, Edo or Delta States. Consequently, lack of a national protest does not take away from a national mandate, which debunks Myth # 3 (lack of protests shows lack on national mandate).

What to do with these figures
This is a thorny question. But consider the following suggestion: the answer seems to lie with the following individuals, who should now tell the nation why we should or should not accept the June 12, 1993 figures, namely:

(1) Abiola (2) Kingibe - the "winning" pair
(3) Tofa (4) Ugo - the "losing" pair
(5) Nwosu (6) Babangida/Abacha - the "official" trio

In all sincerity, we should sit them all down, and have them tell us. In fact, one could toy with the idea of a national referendum following such "tell-all" sessions. However, one is stumped by the puzzle - suppose that the referendum, which after all is an "election" between ideas, if not of persons, is then annulled if its outcome is unacceptable to some, just as June 12 was, then what ?

Simplistic ? Yes, but one is at a loss for any justice without June 12, although one is ready to be convinced for the sake of the country ! Sooner or later, we may have to face the truth - the only alternative to June 12 is the ongoing Constitutional Conference, and the maintenance of its annulment. And that is the government line, which will simply make our nightmare to continue.

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Published with the permission of Dr. Bolaji Aluko