This article was originally published in October 1994
Introduction Periodically, one sits down to reflect on why many individuals (including this writer) are so fixated on June 12, 1993, and why we consider that date so important in the annals of Nigeria's history. Are we just closet partisan ethnicists, or political demagogues, masquerading as Nigerian democrats?
Below, you will find an attempt to provide some answers based solely on the known numerical figures of the June 12, 1993 presidential elections. The claim is that the incontrovertibility of the results, the size of the national mandate and the ethnic compromises which led to it
clearly reveal why the annulment of the elections has so far traumatized a country whose dream for the beginnings of a national consensus suddenly became a nightmare.
The Facts about June 12 The rigor of the election process leading up to the election day itself (the so-called Option A4 implemented by Babangida) is well known. As far as the election itself is concerned, first, all the vote counting had been completed and collated, on a ward-by-ward, local government-by-government and State-by-state basis, and known at these levels; the vote count was never suspended; the release was.
Secondly, the results had been published but never officially released in entirety by the National Electoral Commission (Nwosu as Chairman), a technicality that has been harped on by the governments succeeding Babangida's - of Sonekan, and currently of Abacha.
Thirdly, the two official allegations made by Babangida were that there was vote-buying before the elections (in fact there was a last-minute legal challenge requesting a postponement of the elections by the Association for a Better Nigeria (ABN), led by Arthur Nzeribe, which was thrown out by the Courts) and that the apparent winner Abiola (over challenger Tofa) had a conflict of interest since the Federal Government owes him substantial amounts of money from previous business dealings.
The detailed figures are presented in Table 1, and further analyses are presented in Tables 2,3 and 4.
Table 1 The Annulled June 12, 1993 Nigerian Presidential Elections:
Unofficial Results
Votes Cast
% of Total
State
State Rank by 1991 census
Rank by total votes
Abiola
Tofa
Total
Abiola
Tofa
Region
Lagos
1
2
883,965
149,432
1,033,397
85.54
14.46
SW
Kano
2
22
169,519
154,809
324,328
52.27
47.73
NC
Sokoto
3
12
97,726
372,250
469,976
20.79
79.21
NW
Bauchi
4
4
339,339
524,876
864,175
39.27
60.73
NE
Rivers
5
3
370,678
640,973
1,011,651
36.64
63.46
MN
Kaduna
6
5
389,713
356,880
746,593
52.20
47.80
NC
Ondo
7
1
883.024
162,994
1.046,018
84.42
15.58
SW
Katsina
8
13
171,162
271,077
442,239
38.70
61.30
NC
Oyo
9
7
536.014
105,785
641,799
83.52
16.48
SW
Plateau
10
6
417,565
259,394
676,959
61.68
38.32
MB
Enugu
11
8
263,101
254,050
517,151
50.88
49.12
EA
Jigawa
12
27
138,557
89,636
228,193
60.72
39.28
NC
Benue
13
15
246,830
166,302
433,132
56.99
43.01
MB
Anambra
14
18
212,024
155,029
367,053
57.76
42.24
EA
Borno
15
25
153,490
128,684
282,174
54.40
45.60
NE
Delta
16
11
327,277
146,001
473,278
69.15
30.85
MN
Imo
17
20
159,350
195,836
355,186
44.86
55.14
EA
Niger
18
19
136,350
221,437
357,787
38.11
61.89
NW
Akwa Ibom
19
16
214,782
159,342
374,124
57.41
42.59
MN
Ogun
20
14
365,266
72,068
437,334
83.52
15.48
SW
Abia
21
26
105,273
151,227
256,500
41.08
58.96
EA
Osun
22
10
425,725
59,246
484,971
87.78
12.22
SW
Edo
23
23
205,407
103,572
308,979
66.48
33.52
MN
Adamawa
24
24
140,875
167,239
308,114
45.72
54.28
NE
Kogi
25
9
222,700
265,732
488,432
45.59
54.41
MC
Kebbi
26
28
70,219
144,808
215,027
32.66
67.34
NW
Cross River
27
21
189,303
153,452
342,755
55.23
44.77
MN
Kwara
28
17
288,270
80,219
368,489
78.23
21.77
MC
Taraba
29
30
101,887
64,001
165,888
61.42
38.58
MB
Yobe
30
29
111887
64,061
175,948
63.59
36.41
NE
FCT
31
31
19,968
18,313
38,281
52.16
47.84
MC
Total
8,357,246
5,878,685
14,235,931
58.71
41.29
Note the regions: South-West (SW): Lagos, Ondo, Oyo, Ogun, Oshun {Abiola wins all 5 states}
East (EA): Enugu, Anambra, Imo, Abia {Abiola wins the first 2 states}
North-West (NW): Sokoto, Niger, Kebbi {Tofa wins all 3 states}
North-East (NE): Adamawa, Borno, Bauchi, Yobe {Abiola wins first 2 states}
North-Central(NC): Kano, Kaduna, Jigawa, Katsina {Abiola wins first 3 states}
Middle-Belt (MB): Plateau, Benue, Taraba {Abiola wins all 3 states}
Minority (MN): Delta, Akwa-Ibom, Edo, Cross-River, Rivers {Abiola wins
first 4 states}
Mid-Central (MC): Kwara, Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Kogi {Abiola
wins first 2 states}
The "traditional" Northern Region comprised the NW, NE, NC, MB and MC regions,
the Western Region was the SW region, the Eastern Region comprised EA region,
Akwa-Ibom, Cross-Rivers and Rivers States, and the Mid-West Region
comprised Edo and Delta states.
Table 2: State Analysis of 1993 Presidential Elections
State
State Rank by 1991 census
Rank by total votes
1991
Census Count
Census Votes Cast
Total Participation Index
Election Partic Ranking
Election Winner
Win Ratio
Lagos
1
2
5.685,781
1,033,397
40.21
13
Abiola
5.92
Kano
2
22
5,362,040
324,328
12.74
31
Abiola
1.10
Sokoto
3
12
4,392,391
469,976
23.67
27
Tofa
3.81
Bauchi
4
4
4,294,413
864,175
44.52
7
Tofa
1.55
Rivers
5
3
3,983,857
1,011,651
56.18
2
Tofa
1.73
Kaduna
6
5
3,969,252
746,593
41.62
8
Abiola
1.09
Ondo
7
1
3,884,485
1.046,018
59.58
1
Abiola
1.09
Katsina
8
13
3,878,344
442,239
25.23
23
Tofa
1.58
Oyo
9
7
3,488,789
641,799
40.70
11
Abiola
5.07
Plateau
10
6
3,283,784
676,959
45.61
6
Abiola
1.61
Enugu
11
8
3,161,295
517,151
36.19
14
Abiola
1.04
Jigawa
12
27
2,829,929
228,193
17.84
30
Abiola
1.55
Benue
13
15
2,780,398
433,132
34.47
16
Abiola
1.33
Anambra
14
18
2,767,903
367,053
29.34
21
Abiola
1.37
Borno
15
25
2,596,589
282,174
24.04
26
Abiola
1.92
Delta
16
11
2,570,181
473,278
40.74
10
Abiola
2.24
Imo
17
20
2,485,499
355,186
31.62
20
Tofa
1.23
Niger
18
19
2,482,367
357,787
31.89
18
Tofa
1.62
Akwa Ibom
19
16
2,359,736
374,124
35.08
15
Abiola
1.35
Ogun
20
14
2,338,570
437,334
41.38
9
Abiola
5.07
Abia
21
26
2,297,978
256,500
24.70
25
Tofa
1.44
Osun
22
10
2,203,016
484,971
48.71
5
Abiola
7.18
Edo
23
23
2,159,848
308,979
31.65
19
Abiola
1.98
Adamawa
24
24
2,124,049
308,114
32.09
17
Tofa
1.19
Kogi
25
9
2,099,046
488,432
51.48
4
Tofa
1.19
Kebbi
26
28
2,062,226
215,027
23.07
28
Tofa
2.06
Cross River
27
21
1,865,604
342,755
40.65
12
Abiola
1.23
Kwara
28
17
1,566,469
368,489
52.05
3
Abiola
3.59
Taraba
29
30
1,728,590
165,888
24.79
24
Abiola
1.59
Yobe
30
29
1,411,481
175,948
27.58
22
Abiola
1.75
FCT
31
31
378,671
38,281
22.37
29
Abiola
1.09
Total
88,515,581
14,235,931
35.58
Abiola
1.42
Notes on Table 2:
Election Participation Index = 100 * Numerator / Denominator
Numerator: Total number of votes cast in State (or region)
Denominator:1991 State (or Regional) Census multiplied by (40/88.5)
The Denominator is an estimate of the voting population (could
be replaced by actual voter registration); 40 million is the voting
population, 88.5 million is the total Nigerian population. The
denominator presumes that the voter population is distributed uniformly
throughout the country.
Note that an index close to 100 would indicate almost 100% voting. An
index of over 100 could indicate some election fraud, unless there is
significant on-sight registration.
Regional Analysis of Results The above are the raw data. If you accept them, then the discussion can proceed. From these data we can get some information through interpretive analysis. Again, you may disagree with the conclusions, but you have the privilege of working with the same data and coming up with your own
conclusions.
The analysis below is based on the following assumptions:
the 1991 census data is correct. (latest indications are that they are
now being belatedly questioned at the National Constitutional
Conference going on in Abuja.)
the 1993 Presidential results quoted above are correct;
the regional division of the states provided above is acceptable.
Table 3
Regional Analysis of 1993 Presidential Election Results
Rankings
Votes Cast
% of
Region
Rank by 1991 census
Total
Votes & participation
Abiola
Tofa
Total
Abiola
Tofa
South West (SW)
1
1
2
3,093,994
549,525
3,643,519
84.92
15.08
East (EA)
4
5
6
739,748
756,142
1,495,890
49.45
50.55
North West (NW)
6
7
7
304,295
738,495
1,042,790
29.18
70.82
North East (NE)
5
4
5
745,591
884,820
1,630,411
45.73
54.27
North Central (NC)
2
3
8
868,951
872,402
1,741,353
49.90
50.10
Middle Belt (MB)
7
6
4
766,282
509,697
1,275,979
60.05
39.95
Minority (MN
3
2
3
1,307,447
1,203,340
2,510,787
52.07
47.93
Mid Central (MC
8
8
1
530,938
364,264
895,202
59.31
40.69
Total
8,357,246
5,878,685
14,253,931
58.71
41.29
Table 4: Comparative Regional Analysis of Census/Results
Rankings
Region
1991 Census Count
Census Votes Cast
Total Participation Index
Rank by 1991 census
Total
Votes & participation
Winner
Win Ratio
South West (SW)
17,600,641
3,643,519
45.80
1
1
2
Abiola
5.63
East (EA)
10,712,675
1,495,890
30.89
4
5
6
Tofa
1.02
North West (NW)
8,936,984
1,042,790
25.82
6
7
7
Tofa
2.43
North East (NE)
10,426,532
1,630,411
34.60
5
4
5
Tofa
1.19
North Central (NC)
16,309,565
1,741,353
23.62
2
3
8
Tofa
1.00
Middle Belt (MB)
7,544,772
1,275,979
37.42
7
6
4
Abiola
1.50
Minority (MN
12,939,226
2,510,787
42.93
3
2
3
Abiola
1.09
Mid Central (MC
4,044,186
895,202
48.97
8
8
1
Abiola
1.46
Total
88,514,581
14,253,931
35.38
Abiola
1.42
What the Regional Analysis Means - an Objective (?) View Election results are often subjected to regional analyses because their outcomes affect the electorate most where they reside (city, state), and where they are most likely to travel (region). However, due to the peculiar ethno-geography and history of Nigeria, there is a keen identification between ethnic groups and regions: for example, the Yoruba live mostly in the
South-West, the Hausa-Fulani mostly in the Northern regions, and the Igbo in the East.
Conseqently, ethnic qualifications of electoral trends, even when resisted (as this writer is attempting to), cannot be escaped. It is with the above riders that the following statements are made.
Total votes cast of 14.2 million is 35.6% of the voter population of
40 million (out of a total population of 88.5 milion). For a nation
that is about 50% illiterate, that is a high percentage, and any
mandate should be regarded as a national one.
If you compare the Rank by 1991 Census and the Election Participation
Indices/Total Votes Rankings, there were some regions which appeared to
be extremely keen on voting (Mid-Central, Middle Belt), others voted
somewhat in proportion to their population (Southwest, Northeast,
Minority), while some appeared relatively disinterested in voting
(East, Northwest, particularly North Central.) Of course, this may
have been a result of last minute confusion about whether the election
was on or off.
The Southwest voted in favor of Abiola 6:1 relative to Tofa,
the Northwest voted in favor of Tofa 2.5:1 relative to Abiola,
the Middle-Belt and Mid-Central voted 1.5:1 in favor of Abiola, but
everywhere else it was a toss-up, with Abiola having an edge in the
Minority region, and Tofa having an edge in the East, Northeast and
NorthCentral regions.
It is also interesting to note that Abiola won 5:1 in his home state
(Ogun), and also edged Tofa in the latter's home state (Kano);
furthermore, Kano State registered the lowest Election Participation
Ranking as shown in Table 2. Note that Abiola won with the highest
Win Ratio in Osun State (7.18), while Tofa won with his highest ratio
in Sokoto State (3.81).
Taking the above together, Tofa seems to have won in regions where there was in general voter apathy, while Abiola won in regions where people were most keen on voting. Even on a state-by-state basis, this conclusion is justified.
The regional analysis also seems to debunk three myths:
The first myth is that Abiola could have won without including
the SouthWest votes, a claim often made by his supporters to
enhance their claim of Abiola's national appeal away from his home-base.
Now, if we take the Southwest votes away from Abiola alone, Tofa wins:
Abiola: 5,263,252 Tofa: 5,878,685
If we take the Southwest votes away from both of them, Tofa still
wins marginally:
Abiola: 5,263,252 Tofa: 5,329,160
Therefore, Abiola was actually very much helped by the Southwest votes.
However, the analysis above shows that it was a keen contest
with Abiola holding his own away from his home base, and subject
to a loss if he had not. Any allegation of vote buying is difficult
to justify from these numbers, particularly when we also look at
the "reasonableness" of the Election Participation Indices of
Tables 2 and 4.
In defence against accusations about lack of sustained post-annulment
protests in the East, there have always been claims by some that the
East voted "massively" for Abiola (Myth # 2), and hence had done all
they could for the struggle for democracy. If that is the case, then
there was also "massive" voting for Tofa, so much so that he won in the
East Region.
Abiola: 739,748 Tofa: 756,142
Even if we include Cross River, Akwa-Ibom and Rivers States in the
"East" (they are currently included in the Minority Region), then Tofa
still wins the East:
Abiola: 1,516,511 Tofa: 1,709,909
with the Rivers State (out of these three non-Igbo Eastern states)
contributing largely to maintaining the scale in favor of Tofa by voting
for him 1.5:1 over Abiola.
What the close vote for Abiola in the Igbo East shows is not
"massive" voting, but rather a "magnaminous" heart of the Igbo in these
elections, bearing in mind the following facts:
Dr. Sylvester Ugo, vice-presidential candidate of Tofa, is Igbo
and the former Central Bank Governor of Biafra. If Abiola's
ticket prevailed, it would mean a rare period in which an Igbo
would not be No. 1 or 2 in Federal government (notice Azikiwe,
Ironsi, Ukiwe (albeit briefly), Ekwueme)
there is still residual visceral resentment against Yorubas and
Awolowo over the Biafran episode (Abiola is Yoruba).
The regional analysis also gives an insight into the pattern of
protests following the annulment. Since the Southwest voted 6:1
for Abiola, it was most indignant about the annulment, and showed
it, sometimes violently. Also, Edo State and Delta State both
voted more than 2:1 for Abiola, hence a similar indignation.
The disenchantment of Kwara State, which voted for Abiola 3.5:1
appears to have been embodied in the indignation of their former
Governor, Chief C.O. Adebayo, who is one of the earliest
and longest-held detainees.
Elsewhere, where Tofa either won, or
votes were evenly split, the human tendency to be a sore loser, or for
each person to dissuade his neighbor from any violent tendency was bound
to make the reaction much more muted than in the Southwest, Edo or Delta
States. Consequently, lack of a national protest does not take away from
a national mandate, which debunks Myth # 3 (lack of protests shows lack
on national mandate).
What to do with these figures This is a thorny question. But consider the following suggestion:
the answer seems to lie with the following individuals, who should now tell
the nation why we should or should not accept the June 12, 1993 figures, namely:
(1) Abiola (2) Kingibe - the "winning" pair
(3) Tofa (4) Ugo - the "losing" pair
(5) Nwosu (6) Babangida/Abacha - the "official" trio
In all sincerity, we should sit them all down, and have them tell us.
In fact, one could toy with the idea of a national referendum following
such "tell-all" sessions. However, one is stumped by the puzzle - suppose
that the referendum, which after all is an "election" between ideas, if not of
persons, is then annulled if its outcome is unacceptable to some, just as
June 12 was, then what ?
Simplistic ? Yes, but one is at a loss for any justice without June 12,
although one is ready to be convinced for the sake of the country !
Sooner or later, we may have to face the truth - the only alternative to
June 12 is the ongoing Constitutional Conference, and the maintenance of its
annulment. And that is the government line, which will simply make our
nightmare to continue.
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