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Framework For Renewed Federalism in Nigeria
By O. Igho Natufe, Ph.D.
Ottawa, Canada
February 2001

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Introduction
The inauguration of President Olusegun Obasanjo on May 29, 1999, as the 2nd President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria was an event of great historical significance. It terminated 16 years of military dictatorship that had ruled the country since December 31, 1983 when the military junta overthrew the government of Nigeria's Second Republic headed by President Shehu Shagari, the 1st elected President. Olusegun Obasanjo had the presidency delivered to him on a silver platter. Soon after his release from prison where he had been incarcerated by the military junta of General Sanni Abacha for his role in an alleged coup plot, Obasanjo was persuaded and drafted by his friends (military and civilian) to contest for the presidency. It is alleged that his friends provided more than 140 million naira for his presidential campaign. This makes him, arguably the luckiest Nigerian of the 20th century.

Nigerian elected civilian leaders were gradually learning the art of governing a multiethnic country when a group of young military officers overthrew the First Republic on January 15, 1966, less than six years after Nigeria attained political independence on October 1, 1960. It is debatable if the "reasons" advanced by the coup plotters as justification for their actions could have led to the current stunted growth, mass poverty, political disarray and economic ruin of the country if they had not aborted the democratic process on January 15, 1966.

By intervening in the political process the coup plotters divorced the military from its constitutional role as a subordinate to elected civilian governments as it usurped political power. They set in motion an irreversible chain reaction that plummeted the country into the civil war of 1967-1970, and subjected Nigeria to military dictatorships from January 15, 1966 - October 1, 1979 and from December 31, 1983 - May 29, 1999. Thus, the coup plotters of January 15, 1966 established a precedent which has been replicated by their colleagues in a revolving-door process that "legitimizes" military coups as viable alternatives to constitutional governments.

As a former General in the army, Obasanjo was a prominent participant of Nigeria's military dictatorships. He replaced Col. Benjamin Adekunle as the commander of Nigeria's 3rdmarine during the civil war against the secessionist regime of Lt. Col Emeka Ojukwu's Biafra. When a section of the military overthrew the military regime of General Yakubu Gowon on July 29, 1975, Obasanjo became the second in command to General Murtala Muhammed, only to assume leadership of the military government when Muhammed was assassinated in an abortive military coup on February 13, 1976. As head of Nigeria's military government, Obasanjo presided over the constitutional process that led to the return of civilian government on October 1, 1979, with the inauguration of Shehu Shagari as Nigeria's 1st executive President. We were informed that Obasanjo "voluntarily relinquished" power to an elected civilian regime in 1979.

However, while it is true that he "relinquished"power in 1979, it is doubtful whether he "voluntarily" did so. Was he compelled to relinquish power to a northerner, Shehu Shagari in 1979 by the same politico-military forces that conscripted him to contest the presidency in 1999 and bankrolled his successful presidential campaign in the process? Was his conscription a payback for his actions of 1979? Did the same forces facilitate the annulment of the June 12, 1993 presidential elections that were allegedly won by a southerner, M. K. O. Abiola? These questions are vital, though beyond the scope of this paper.

Nevertheless, the politics of twelve-two-third of the 1979 presidential election, the annulment of June 12, 1993, and the undisclosed "friends" that provided more than 140 million naira to Obasanjo's 1999 presidential election would seem to suggest new meaning to the concept of Obasanjo's "voluntary relinquishment" of power in 1979.

By presiding over the return to democratic government in 1979, Obasanjo earned himself an immediate global recognition as a "democrat" and a "statesman." Witness his membership in the Commonwealth's contact group on South Africa and several international leadership fora. His Otta Farm became a centre for various international meetings on democratic government and governance. However, irrespective of these seemingly impressive credentials, his conscription as a presidential candidate did not generate any meaningful support from his own electoral ward and his geopolitical zone, where he was perceived as a stooge of powerful military and political interests inimical to democratic practice.

Obasanjo resents being labeled an anti-democrat. In an interview two months before the February 1999 presidential elections, he described himself as a "social democrat" and an adherent of "true federalism" who believes in peaceful discussions of conflicts. He affirmed that it is impossible to build a viable "economic base" without "a stable political base." (See, The Guardian, Sunday, Lagos, December 27, 1998.) By recognizing the imperative of "a stable political base" as a prerequisite for economic development, Obasanjo gave the impression of a leader who will take measures to ensure political stability in the Nigerian polity following his election as president.

The main objective of this paper is to analyze the problematic of federalism in Nigeria, and not necessarily to assess the presidency of Olusegun Obasanjo. I will examine the problems and offer some solutions on the future of federalism in Nigeria. However, the position of President Obasanjo on the subject will be involved in the analysis.

Federal Polity
Obasanjo inherited a Nigerian polity that has been raped and brutally plundered by a series of military juntas, and corrupted and mismanaged by the Second Republic. With very few exemptions, most of the current leaders at either local, state or federal levels participated in or benefitted from the pillage of Nigeria in the previous governments. They were elected in 1999 for a four-year term. Some may argue that it is premature to assess their performances, just midway through their first term in office.

In fact, Alhaji Ibrahim Kashim-Imam, Obasanjo's Presidential Liaison Officer in the Senate, underlined this position recently in Abuja.(See, The Guardian, Lagos, January 23, 2001) This notwithstanding, it is my view that the president and the elected officials have provided us with enough information to draw some conclusions on their conduct in office.

Federal-state relations since May 29, 1999 have been on very shaky grounds. This state of affairs is caused by the competing trends of federative interpretations in the country. On one end is the demand for true federalism where each federating unit will exercise exclusive jurisdictions in certain areas, including natural resources. This view is opposed by those who favour the status quo. The controversy over this phenomenon has acquired a North-South dichotomy as evidenced by the position of the southern governors who favour the first proposition, and by the northern governors who favour the status quo.

Interestingly, President Obasanjo and most members of the National Assembly (the House of Representatives and the Senate) also favour the status quo. The view of President Obasanjo is crucial, given his pre election interview cited above. His fixation to operate a federal system through the prism of military dictatorship is causing severe strains on the future of federalism in Nigeria. Witness his letter of November 10, 1999, in which he "instructed" Governor Dieprete Alamieyeseigha of Bayelsa State, and gave the Governor 14 (fourteen) days ultimatum or face the brutality of the Nigerian Army. The invasion and destruction of Odi later followed. (Click here for a detailed report of the Odi invasion)

The Problems
Before discussing the problems of the Nigerian federal structure, it is important that we remind ourselves of the essentials of federalism. There is a federal government because the federating units agree to establish such a government. Thus, a federal government is the creation of the federating units. A federal system is a form of government with two levels of governments: a central government and state (or provincial) governments. Neither level of government is subordinate to the other. They are coordinates, and exercise complete independence in their respective spheres of jurisdictions. Federal is derived from the Latin "fidere" which means "to trust." When, for example, the thirteen American colonies began a process in 1774 that culminated in the establishment of the federal government of the United States of America, they agreed to entrust certain functions to the central government.

They did not negotiate a federal government in order to emasculate themselves or to become vassals of the federal government. They agreed on how much power to grant the federal government without compromising their independence. The same was true in Canada in 1867 when the four founding provinces agreed to establish the federal government of Canada. In both cases, the federating units retained their jurisdictions in core political and economic spheres, including natural resources. (As used in this paper, natural resources are defined as land, agriculture, forestry, mining, oil exploration.) They also retained jurisdiction over state (and provincial) security in the form of their respective police establishments, but readily conceded, for example, foreign policy, defense, currency, and national security to the federal government. Even in the field of international trade agreements, the Canadian federal government has to obtain the consent of the provincial governments where such international trade agreements relate to areas under provincial jurisdictions.

It is pertinent to understand why states (or provinces) agree to establish a federal government. In varying degrees, three factors influence the decision of states or provinces to federate. These are (1) socioeconomic; (2) political; and (3) security. A state elects to join a federation for socioeconomic reasons because of the following: -

• It has shared values with other federating units.
• It wants an access to a larger domestic market.
• It desires a secured access to a sea port.
• It seeks access to a higher standard of living.
• It wants to enhance its welfare policies.

For political reasons, a state agrees to federate in order to strengthen existing relations with its co-federating units and to possess a stronger voice internationally. Thirdly, a state constructs a federal polity in order to be able to protect itself from real or an imagined threat to its national security. These factors significantly influenced the decision of America's thirteen colonies and Canada's four provinces to negotiate their respective federal systems.

The United States and Canada remain the models of federalism. Other successful federations, for instance, Australia, Germany, India, and Malaysia have built on the U.S. and Canadian examples.

What is the state of federalism in Nigeria? The argument in favour of the status quo in Nigeria is based primarily on the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999. This constitution, supposedly a federal constitution, is in reality a unitary document that structures the country into obsequious administrative units that are referred to as states. Besides the name of the document, its core is defined in strict unitary terms. In contrast to the 1963 Republican Constitution, the 1999 variant is reflective of the military doctrine that inspired its drafting. It is highly unlikely that the military, a unitary command-based institution will produce a federal constitution.

The basic tenets of military political orientation hinder its capability to design a federal polity. Furthermore, given his military training, it is obvious that President Obasanjo does not possess the dispositions nor the coordinating skills required of federalists. Thus, in political and economic terms, Nigeria is administered as a unitary polity. As will be demonstrated later in this paper, an examination of selected jurisdictional questions in the 1999 Constitution clearly underlines the command-centralizing powers of the central government vis-a-vis the states. This tendency subordinates the states to the central government, a contradiction of the key fundamental premise of federalism.

As any perceptive scholar of Nigerian federalism will know, Nigeria was on its way to emulating the United States' example in its 1963 Republican Constitution, until the military aborted the democratic process on January 15, 1966. That unfortunate event of January 1966 led to the systematic dismantling of federalism in Nigeria, as military doctrine began to define the form and content of Nigerian federalism. It was conceptually incongruous that successive Nigerian military regimes were referred to as "Federal Military Government of Nigeria." It was equally disappointing that many Nigerian academics gave credence to this aberration by referring to the military regime as a "Federal Military Government." The explanation for such blatant contradictions may reside in the psychic of the average Nigerian "federalist." Let me explain.

There is a misleading belief that the political structures currently in place in Nigeria reflect the virtues of federalism. An in-depth analysis of the structures and operations of political parties will clearly illustrate the unitary nature of these parties, as we have witnessed in both the Second and Third republics. The national executive committee of each of the political parties dictates the strategic directions of that party's state and local government formations. For example, this compels candidates for state or local government elections to seek the approval of their respective national executive committees, an unhealthy phenomenon which negates the independence of the federating units. While Nigerians clamour for true federalism, it is disturbingly convincing that they cannot resist the lure of monolithic institutions. As a rule, therefore, elected officials are no longer required to promote and defend the interests of their constituencies, rather they become uncritical emissaries of the national executive committees of their respective political parties.

The party line, dictated by the national executive committee in typical Soviet-style federalism, becomes the operative factor in their conception of federalism. Like their Soviet counterparts, Nigerian "federalists" willingly construct monolithic institutions to operate a federal polity. The current situation where the governor of a state is subservient to the national executive committee of his political party, and not to his electorates in the given state, reinforces the abuse of federalism in Nigeria.

Furthermore, the notion that political party formation and registration must be limited to a certain number denies the free expression of political activities in the polity. This right belongs to the electorates on election days, and not to any electoral commission. The jurisdictions of the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) should be restricted to federal elections to the offices of the President, Vice President, the Senate and House of Representatives. INEC should have no jurisdictions over elections to state offices - Governor, Deputy Governor, House of Assembly, and local government councils. State electoral commissions must be independent of the INEC in their statues and operations.

A neglected theme in the series of abnormalities in Nigeria's federalism, is the monolithic salary structure of public (federal and state) institutions, including the universities. I recall a meeting at the residence of the Nigerian High Commissioner in 1992 in Ottawa, Canada, with members of Nigeria's federal salary commission during their global trip to study the salary structures of federal states. They were thoroughly briefed on the Canadian example, which is not different from those of other federations that they visited. It remains only a bafflement what their recommendations was on their return to Nigeria. Federalism is not about uniformities, but the recognition of diversities. While a uniform, national salary structure is a prerequisite of a unitary political system, it is incongruous with the tenets of federalism. The imposition of this as a national practice violates the independence of the federating units in establishing their respective salary structures. The government of Edo State, for example, should establish its public sector salary structure to reflect its capabilities, irrespective of what obtains in any other state or at the federal level. Even within a given state, the salary structures of universities need not be uniform, but reflective of their respective revenue base.

Thus, if Nigerians really want to establish a solid base for true federalism, it is imperative that they begin to construct non-monolithic political and institutional structures that will reflect the independence of the federating units. Nigerians admire the romantic appeal of federalism, but they cannot divorce themselves from the grips of unitary institutions, including a unitary police system.

A related issue which mocks the federal republican pretensions of Nigeria is the existence of hundreds of monarchies in the country. It suggests that Nigerians are operating a republican system anchored on monarchies. These monarchies, some of which were powerful empires prior to the intrusion of British colonialism, have been reduced to serving the interests of successive Nigerian governments as agents of grass root mobilization for the latter. While Nigerian political leaders pay lip service to these kings (traditional rulers), they do not hesitate to treat them with contempt as dictated by political expediencies. Not only does this challenges the relevancy of traditional rulers, the fact that they exist also raises a philosophical question vis-a-vis the coexistence of republicanism and monarchism in a single polity. This coexistence is unhealthy for both phenomena as their respective legitimacy and credibility are increasingly compromised by the clashes of political values. Nigeria has a choice to be a true federal republic with no room for monarchies.

In the alternative, where Nigerians elect to retain their respective monarchies, then serious consideration should be given to changing the name of the country to the United Kingdoms of Nigeria. In my view, this will more appropriately reflect the socio-cultural and political realities of contemporary Nigeria. If the latter option becomes the choice of Nigerians, then they have to reconstruct the constitutional role of their respective monarchs in such a way that lends respect, legitimacy and credibility to their kingdoms. The status quo ridicules Nigeria's traditional rulers as it reduces them to mere political pawns of the regime regulators. Take for example, the order that "directed" the traditional rulers of Oyo State "to remain in their respective domains" during the February 1 - 2, 2001 visit to that state by President Olusegun Obasanjo.(See, Sina Babasola, "Oyo Obas get stay-at-home order as Obasanjo visits", Vanguard, Lagos, February 1, 2001.) Under what constitutional authority was this "directive" issued? Are the traditional rulers subject to the "directives" of the President in the same way that his ministers are?

These are troubling questions which Nigerians must address. It is common knowledge that traditional rulers have systematically lost their authority and power since Nigeria's encounter with British colonialism. Prior to this episode, they wielded executive authority and power over their respective governments and subjects. The British curtailed this by reducing the traditional rulers to the role of agents whom they, the British, elected to send into exile as they see fit. In post colonial Nigeria, the traditional rulers are still subjected to the same treatment they received under colonialism, as some of them have been demoted, ordered to remain within their domains, and exiled for political reasons.

Let us examine the selected jurisdictional questions in the 1999 Constitution that I promised. There is no disagreement with Section 2 (2) that describes Nigeria as "a Federation consisting of States and a federal Capital Territory." But Section 3 (1) that says there "shall be 36 states in Nigeria" is irrelevant. Of particular interest in Section 3 are subsections (3) and (5) that defined the capitals of states and itemized the local governments respectively. A federal government has no jurisdiction to establish state capitals, neither is it within its jurisdiction to create local governments. By virtue of the imperatives of federalism, these subsections, and related sections and subsections of the 1999 Constitution that deal with these issues should be declared null and void. These issues are clearly under the jurisdictions of the respective federating units. As an independent political entity that freely agrees to construct a federal system, the location of its capital and the division of the state into local government councils is the exclusive jurisdiction of the state concerned. The usurpation of this jurisdiction by the federal government is responsible for the arbitrariness in the manner local government councils were established. Were Nigeria a unitary state, then the central government would be justified in creating local governments.

In reviewing the 1999 Constitution, the following issues readily come to mind: -

1. Part I: Exclusive Legislative List (Second Schedule)
   • Section 22: Election to the offices of ...Governor and Deputy Governor or any office to which a person may be elected under this Constitution,....(Comment: The elections of Governor and Deputy Governor should be under exclusive state jurisdiction)

   • Section 39: Mines and minerals, including oil fields, oil mining, geological surveys and natural gas. (Comment: Mines and minerals, including oil fields, oil mining and natural gas should be under exclusive state jurisdiction. Geological surveys should be under concurrent federal-state jurisdictions)

   • Section 45: Police. (Comment: Each state should have the jurisdiction to establish its own police, independent of some federal police).

   • Section 48: Prisons. (Comment: Each state should have the jurisdiction to operate its own prisons, independent of federal prisons).

   • Section 51: Public holidays. (Comment: Each state should have the jurisdiction to declare its own public holidays, independent of federal public holidays.)

   • Section 62: Trade and commerce between the states.(Comment: This should be under concurrent federal-state jurisdictions. A federal role should be restricted to establishing, in consultation with the states, broad policy guidelines on inter state trade and commerce.)

2. Part II: Concurrent Legislative List Extent of Federal and State Legislative Powers (Second Schedule)
   • Section 1: Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the National Assembly may by an Act make provisions for (a) the division of public revenue (iii) between the states and local government councils, and (iv) among the local government councils in the states. (Comment: These are clearly under the authority of a State House of Assembly, and thus they are exclusive state jurisdictions.)

The above are examples of some of the provisions in the 1999 Constitution that grossly undermine the independence of the federating units in Nigeria's federalism. I will not dwell on the imperative for state exclusive jurisdictions over natural resources (mines and minerals, including oil fields, oil mining, and natural gas), as much has been said about this subject. However, it must be emphasized that the opposition against the exclusive state jurisdiction over natural resources will only facilitate the disintegration of Nigeria.

A fundamental aspect of federalism is the acceptance and recognition of diversities. It is within the rights of each federating unit to celebrate its uniqueness, so long as it does not offend the sensitivities of other federating units. While federating units may elect to celebrate certain events as federal public holidays in their jurisdictions, they also have the exclusive rights to celebrate their respective public holidays dictated by their particular history and culture. To deny them this right is to disregard their independence. For example, the southwestern states have the right to celebrate Oduduwa's birthday as a public holiday, if they so choose.

Unlike the military, the police in a federal polity cannot be a monolithic structure. This is buttressed by the examples of successful federations. The argument by the opponents of a state police is based on the assumption that a state governor will convert it into an oppressive force against political rivals. This is a weak thesis. It assumes that a president will not abuse the use of a federal police in political crises. State civil security matters should be under the jurisdiction of individual states.

The sour nature of federal-state relations in Nigeria is caused by the centralization of jurisdictions in the federal government. While the Obasanjo presidency and its supporters cling to the status quo as they rely on the provisions of the 1999 Constitution, the proponents of change refuse to recognize the 1999 Constitution as a reflection of balanced federalism. Opposition to the status quo on this issue was led by the southwestern political zone and by the Ezon of the Niger Delta. The persistence of these actors was instrumental in the bipartisan endorsement of this position by the governors of the southern states, as witnessed by their summits and communique of October 2000 and January 2001 in Lagos and Enugu respectively.

While the northern governors support the status quo, it is interesting to note that a group of northern political activists has lent its support to the southern view. Furthermore, the myth of a monolithic north was recently shattered over this crucial issue when a powerful group of politicians from the Middle Belt dissociated itself from the northern position, and endorsed the southern proposals for restructuring Nigerian federalism. The recent decision of the Union of Niger Delta and the Middle Belt to forge an alliance on this issue has also enhanced the arguments for change in the polity.

There is a growing recognition of the inevitability of change in Nigeria. But the question is to determine the forum under which Nigerians could discuss the issue. Will it be under the auspices of a Sovereign National Conference (SNC) or a National Conference? The opposition to an SNC seems to be based on the philosophical concept of sovereign. Where does sovereignty lie in a polity? President Obasanjo expressed his views on this issue at his state visit to Oyo State on February 1, 2001, when he declared at Ibadan:

"There cannot be two sovereignties in a nation. The only thing I can do is to give it back to the people who have surrendered it to me. So, those who are calling for an SNC, I do not know what they are talking about."

While President Obasanjo objected to an SNC as the forum to discuss constitutional changes, he did not seem to reject the imperative of holding such a constitutional conference. He opined: "Of course, you have a national conference, but SNC, I do not, I repeat I do not, subscribe to it." (See, The Guardian, Lagos, February 2, 2001.) This is a major reversal of policy by President Obasanjo. It is a response dictated by the evolving national bipartisan demand for structural changes in Nigerian federalism. A key issue to be resolved is the jurisdiction of a national conference vis-a-vis the demand for constitutional changes that will reflect a balanced federal system. The national conference should afford Nigeria's federating units an opportunity to negotiate and agree on areas of federal-state jurisdictions in a renewed Nigerian federal polity.

In short, the federating units, as the creators of the federal polity, will have to agree on how much power they would respectively like to assign to the federal government.

Toward a Stable Nigeria
In order for any national conference on the constitution to be legitimate, it must have the powers to amend the 1999 Constitution. Such a conference must be viewed as a national constitutional conference of the federating units, who alone have the authority to agree on how much power they want to assign to Nigeria's federal government. Without them, there will be no federal government in Nigeria. Thus, the proposed national conference on the constitution must be recognized as the enabling act to define a new federal system in Nigeria. The conference should agree as follows: -

• Two delegates per state, and one delegate per local government from each state.

• One vote per state.

• No majority rule on conflicting issues of respective state jurisdictions.

• Each state House of Assembly to approve the specific areas of jurisdictions its state's delegation had agreed to retain for itself, as well as those it had agreed to concede to the federal government. It will have no jurisdiction to pass a motion rejecting the areas of jurisdictions of other federating units.

• The National Assembly will ratify the constitutional amendments, together with the amendments of states' houses of assembly dealing with the specific areas of jurisdictions of the respective state houses of assembly. It will have no jurisdiction to pass a motion rejecting the areas of jurisdictions of any of the federating units.

In framing the outcome of the national conference on the constitution, careful thoughts should be given to the contending options available to Nigerians. The status quo option will further legitimize the basis of the current constitutional crisis in the country, and lead to the eventual dismemberment of the federation. To opt for a confederation with all its attendant implications is to agree on a staged dissolution of the polity. Should Nigerians desire to remain in a single polity and to build a stable country, federalism suggests itself as the only viable option.

But the federalism I am proposing is a departure from the variant currently in practice in Nigeria as contained in the 1999 Constitution. I propose a balanced federal political system that recognizes a trade off of asymmetrical powers based on the peculiarities of each federating unit. These peculiarities are population, territory, and wealth. The concept of balance is not a 50-50 equation of powers and jurisdictions among the federating units. Asymmetrical federalism allows some federating units to possess more powers than others in given areas of jurisdictions. While the equality of federating units is preferable, it must be stressed that it is not a prerequisite for federalism. The equality of the federating units is reflected in the distribution of seats in the Senate of some federations, for example, Nigeria, the United States, and Australia. On the other hand, the demographics, resources (human and natural), and capabilities are tangible determinants of representative and legislative asymmetry.

Nigeria already has representative asymmetry, as witnessed by the distribution of seats in the House of Representatives. This is a universal practice in other federal states (Canada, United States, Australia, Germany, Malaysia, India, for example) where their lower parliamentary chambers are based on the same principle. In fact, in Canada, both chambers (House of Commons, and the Senate) are based on representative asymmetry.

We have also recognized legislative asymmetry in Nigeria, as witnessed by the introduction of sharia in various states in the country. This is a healthy phenomenon for the development of asymmetrical federalism in Nigeria. Other federations, for example, Canada, the United States, Malaysia, Germany, and Switzerland also have elements of legislative asymmetry in their respective federal constitutions.

Both in theory and practice, Nigeria is already an asymmetrical federal polity. What is needed now is to move beyond sharia, and expand the boundaries of asymmetry to include more jurisdictional options on legislative asymmetry that will enhance the survivability of Nigerian federalism. This will inject both political and fiscal responsibilities in the way the federating units manage their respective economies. It could also influence the fusion of contiguous states in order to enhance their competitiveness in the Nigerian polity.

The basic construct of federalism is the recognition and acceptance of the diversities of the federating units. These diversities are best expressed by asymmetry. To disregard these properties is to construct a unitary political system, and not a federal state. Thus, when Nigerians convene at the national conference on the constitution, the emphasis should be on how much power each State is prepared to concede to the federal government, and not on how much power a coalition of states wants that particular State to concede. The areas of exclusive state jurisdiction that I am referring to include, inter alia, the following: -

• Education, culture, sports, non renewable natural resources and forestry, agriculture, local government, social policy, health, state police, state and local government elections, transport, state tax, domestic trade, highway tool, and vehicle registration.

A state that elects not to exercise any of its jurisdictions in these areas is free to transfer those jurisdictions to the federal government, except in the case of police services which the state concerned must contract from the federal government at a cost. Such a state will also have the right to reclaim those jurisdictions when it feels capable of exercising its exclusive jurisdictions. This opting out clause must be made available to all federating units at the national conference on the constitution. Thus, while State A might opt out of its jurisdictions over natural resources, State B may accept its jurisdictions over natural resources. At a recent meeting of Northern Governors, in declaring that "the North will prosper", Governor Alhaji Bukar Abba Ibrahim of Yobe State, announced that the results of "mineral prospective studies have revealed the availability of petroleum in Bauchi/Gombe areas and the Chad Basin Area among numerous minerals in large commercial quantities all the over the North." (See, Saxone Akhaine, "Northern Governors and quest for national unity". The Guardian, Lagos, January 31, 2001.) These states should have exclusive jurisdictions over those natural resources.

With regards to education and health, the federating units should recognize a coordinating policy role for the federal government. A federal role in these areas should be restricted to the formulation of broad national policy guidelines and the establishment of national standards, based on extensive consultations with the federating units. With regards to education, the Joint Admissions Matriculation Board should be disbanded, and its functions transferred to the respective states. Federal paramountcy on health research should also be recognized. Federal grants to states on education and health should be dependent on the states' implementations of the agreed guidelines and national standards. Thus, through its spending powers, the federal government will be able to enforce compliance of those policy guidelines and national standards.

• Each state to have its own constitution and flag

Exclusive federal jurisdictions should include the following: -

• Defense, foreign policy and international relations, international trade, currency, federal tax, census, citizenship, aviation, immigration, national security, federal elections, and any other areas deemed necessary for the smooth running of the federal government as agreed to by 60% of federating units plus 50% of the minority states.

In executing its jurisdictions, the federal government should always remember its fundamental role as a coordinator of national policies. For example, a robust strategy on international trade policy must be the product of successful consultations with federating units, especially those states whose jurisdictions are impacted by such a policy. Thus, it is expected that any binding international trade agreement on, for example, Nigeria's export of commodities (groundnuts, cocoa, rubber, palm-oil, oil & gas, etc.) will bear the direct input of the states concerned. Immigration is another area of federal jurisdiction that has implications on the federating units' population and manpower.

Since immigrants are going to reside in the states, it is essential that the federal government also consults with the states on immigration policy. The federal government cannot just grant immigrant status to foreigners and post them to any state at will. A federal government decision to grant immigrant status to foreigners must be predicated on the willingness of states to accommodate those immigrants. The federal government must recognize its jurisdictional limitations on these areas, and be prepared to coordinate with the states on how best to fashion a national strategy on a given policy. Federalism grants the federal government a status as a subject of international law, but that status is derived from the agreement of the federating units.

Areas of federal-state concurrent jurisdictions: -

• Public works, electricity, railways, geological surveys, etc.

The proposed national conference on the constitution must also address the twin issue of "power shift" and "rotation" of elective offices. It is pertinent to note that, the adherents of the status quo have consistently violated the provisions of the 1999 Constitution that they profess to uphold. I have searched the document to no avail for any references to "power shift" and "rotation" of elective offices. According to section 50 (1) of the 1999 Constitution, "there shall be (a) a President and a Deputy President of the Senate, who shall be elected by the members of that House from among themselves; and (b) a Speaker and a Deputy Speaker of the House of Representatives, who shall be elected by the members of that House from among themselves." The "zoning" of those offices by the political parties is a serious violation of the 1999 Constitution. Thus, the proposed national conference on the constitution must prevent political parties or members of the respective elected federal or state chambers from introducing "zoning" into the electoral process.

With regards to the Senate, for example, it may be necessary for Nigeria to emulate the United States' example whereby the Vice President is the president of the Senate. The Senate should concern itself to electing its majority and minority leaders.

Conclusion
The above proposals will lead to a balanced federal system in Nigeria, if a national conference on the constitution is convened and mandated as outlined in this paper. President Obasanjo has a role to play in this process. Though not a federalist himself, he should be persuaded to endorse these proposals as a guarantor of good government and governance in Nigeria.

Similarly, members of the National Assembly should endorse these proposals, if it is their desire for Nigerians to have a federal system that they deserve. Should President Obasanjo and members of the National Assembly reject the powers of the proposed national conference on the constitution, History will not judge them kindly, for they will have set in motion a process leading to the disintegration of Nigeria.  

Igho Natufe is a Senior Policy Research Advisor with the Department of Natural Resources, Government of Canada, Ottawa, Canada. The views and opinions expressed in this paper do not reflect those of the Department of Natural Resources nor the Canadian Government

 

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Published with the permission of Igho Natufe